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 Abstract 
In this thesis the impact of quality of government on the risk of interstate conflict 
is analyzed. Data on Militarised Interstate Disputes (MIDs) from the Correlates of 
War is used as an indicator of conflict and scores from the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) is applied as a measure of quality of government. The unit of 
analysis is pairs of states, dyads. By employing logistic regression analysis and 
covering the time period of 1985-2000, I find that as the weaker state in a dyad 
gets stronger, the probability of conflict declines. Improved quality of government 
thus reduces the risk of interstate conflict.  
The result is based on a model which includes variables for democracy and 
incomplete democratization, as well as controls for realist claims and geographic 
constrains. Although these findings do not rule out the pacifying benefits of 
democracy, they do add to the argument that, initially, government improvement 
might be more important than democratization for developing countries. 
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 1 Introduction 
Much of the assumed positive effects of democracy on human development have 
been questioned in resent research (Rothstein & Teorell 2008). Instead, it seems 
that what matters most for the promotion of valued social outcomes, such as 
growth, is the quality of government (Holmberg et al. 2008). The belief in 
democracy as the ultimate cure for poverty and other human afflictions has thus 
declined and attention has been shifted towards “good governance” reforms 
(Fukuyama 2004). Democracy-advocates do however hold a trump card in the 
“democratic peace” theory, according to which democracies do not wage war 
against each other (Oneal & Russett 1999). But even the peacefulness of 
democracies has been questioned lately, as some scholars argue that recently 
transformed democracies are even more war prone than autocracies (Mansfield & 
Snyder 2005). The curvilinear relationship between democracy and the probability 
of civil war further questions the pacifying impact of democracy (Herge et al. 
2001). At the same time the risk of civil war linearly decreases as the quality of 
government improves (Öberg & Melander 2005).  
It seems as if good governance, or quality of government as I refer to it, may 
have beneficial effects also on the risk of conflict at the international level. In this 
thesis I attempt to verify whether this is actually the case, by analyzing the impact 
of quality of government on the risk of interstate conflict statistically. 
1.1 Purpose and problem 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how quality of government affects the 
risk of interstate conflict. The guiding question is whether relations between 
qualitatively governed states tend to be peaceful and thus if there exists a “quality 
of government peace”. 
The formulation intentionally draws on the democratic peace proposition and 
should be interpreted as an attempt to disentangle the pacifying impact of joint 
quality of government; that is when two states in a pair, a dyad, are governed 
qualitatively. As is developed at length further on in the thesis, there is reason to 
believe that the pacifying effect of qualitative government is strongest in this 
setting. This allows for a more specific question to be formulated: Do higher 
levels of joint quality of government reduce the risk of interstate conflict? 
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 1.2 Disposition 
The disposition aims at presenting the content of the thesis as clearly as possible. 
It therefore follows the standard scientific formula, including a theory, method, 
and results section. 
The theory chapter outlines the foundations of the democratic peace theory 
and criticism directed against it. Quality of government is introduced as a concept 
and its pacifying impact explained. The chapter ends with a hypothesis based on 
the presented arguments. The method chapter contains information on the 
statistical method applied, the framework of the analysis, and the variables 
included. In the results chapter the results of the analysis are reported and the 
hypothesis is evaluated. Finally, I summarize my findings and comment briefly on 
their implications in the concluding chapter. 
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 2 Theory 
2.1 The Democratic Peace 
The philosophical roots of the democratic peace theory can be traced back to the 
essay “Perpetual peace”, written by Emanuel Kant in the late 18th century. Kant’s 
basic argument is that the public in democracies are pacifistic, while leaders in 
autocracies are warlike. Since citizens are the ones doing the fighting, they are 
likely to be opposed to decisions for war. Democratic leaders who want to remain 
in power must thus obey the will of the people and stay out of war engagement. 
Although many of the assumptions made by Kant have been criticized, the 
“Perpetual peace” remains an important source of inspiration for contemporary 
advocates of the democratic peace proposition (Ray 1995: 1-3). 
The modern versions of the democratic peace theory focus on the relations 
between democracies (Ibid.: 21-30). By conducting large-N regression analysis of 
data regarding pairs of states (dyads), researchers have been able to show that 
there is a correlation between the probability of interstate war and the regime type 
of the dyads. The more democratic the states in a dyad are, the greater is the 
likelihood of peace (Maoz & Abdolali 1989, Bremer 1992, Oneal & Russett 
1999).  
Although these statistical findings to some extent depend on the 
methodological position of the researcher, such as definitions of war and 
democracy and interpretation of statistical significance (Elman 1997a: 20-24), the 
generalization that democracies do not wage war against each other is quite 
uncontested in the research community (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999: 791, 
Kinsella 2005, Paris 2004:42) and it has even been proposed as an empirical law 
(Levy 1988). 
2.1.1 Why Do Democracies Not Fight Each Other? 
How then, is the democratic peace theoretically composed? There are two major 
traits within the literature: the structural, or institutional, and the cultural, or 
normative, explanation. According to the latter, democracies are like-minded and 
have a shared view on economic and political polices and a common political 
culture. Disputes between democracies do not escalate to war because leaders 
expect that their shared political ideology will lead them to find a mutual and 
peaceful resolution of the conflict (Elman 1997a: 10-11). The structural 
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 explanation draws on the ideas introduced by Kant, emphasizing the political 
constraints on democratic leaders which make it more difficult for them to engage 
in war (Ray 1995: 30). Since democratic leaders need the support of the voting 
public before they go to war, they will be reluctant and slow to fight. They will 
count on that other democracies functions in the same way and thereby expect an 
opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement before the conflict escalates to war 
(Elman 1997a: 13). 
In their game theory-inspired model, Bueno de Mesquita and his colleges 
(1999) offer an ambitious institutional explanation of the democratic peace. They 
argue that since democratic leaders can not afford any policy failures, they make a 
greater effort to succeed in disputes, spending more resources on wars they are 
certain to win and avoiding those they risk to lose. This implies that two 
democracies in a conflict will try to avoid war, both of them knowing that such a 
development would be very costly. 
 
2.1.2 Critique and Alternative Explanations 
Both the cultural and the structural explanation of the democratic peace can be, 
and have been, criticized. The normative argument that liberal states only fight 
wars for liberal purposes faces difficulties in explaining the historical record of 
democracies engaged in war for other than humanitarian or self-defense purposes, 
as “liberal states have consistently violated liberal norms when deciding to go to 
war” (Rosato 2003: 588-590).  It is also possible that a state, itself claiming to be 
a democracy, will not be perceived as a democracy by other states. This is 
particularly relevant in the case of recently transformed democracies (Ibid.: 586). 
Critics of the structural explanation claim that the assumption of a pacifying 
public is inaccurate since there are many examples where pressure from the public 
promoted, rather than constrained, leaders to go to war (Elman 1997a: 27). 
Additionally, Rosato (2003: 593-594) has questioned the assumption that 
democratic leaders are more accountable than leaders in autocracies. He claims 
that the cost from fighting losing or costly wars is just as large for autocratic 
leaders as it is for their democratic counterparts. Although the significance of 
Rosato’s findings have been questioned (Kinsella 2005), they deserve 
consideration as autocratic leaders might face far worse treatment than their 
democratic counterparts—should their policies fail—and thus have even larger 
incentives to succeed in disputes. 
There is also the general neorealist critic that democratic norms or institutions 
matter little when national interests are at stake. According to this view, adverse 
distribution of military power and common security interests often account for 
why democracies have avoided war in the past (Elman 1997a: 25). Arguing along 
these lines, a number of alternative interpretations of the democratic peace have 
been put forward. Rosato (2003) introduces the “imperial peace” and claims that 
the democratic peace is “a post-World war II phenomenon restricted to the 
Americas and Western Europe” and should be ascribed to the US commitment to 
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 ensure peace in these regions. Faber & Gowa (1997) argue that violent disputes 
between democracies are only rare events during the Cold War and that the 
dispute patterns are explained by common interests rather than common polities. 
Gartzke (1998, 2000) offers yet another solution and claims that the democratic 
peace is really not caused by the constraining power of democratic political 
institutions or culture, but rather by the lack of conflict between democracies due 
to affinity.  
While these, somewhat similar, explanations rightfully question the 
universality of the democratic peace theory, it is possible to argue that they do not 
really contradict its foundations. The “lack of conflict” and “common interests” 
between democracies might very well be a result of their common polities. 
Additionally, the growing number of democratic states in the world further 
questions the assumption that national interests solely account for the 
peacefulness of democracies.  
Finally, there is a geographical constraint to the likelihood of conflict. To run 
the risk of developing a conflict, regardless of regime type, states need to have the 
opportunity to interact with each other. Unsurprisingly, it is easier for states that 
share borders to interact with each other and consequently these states run a 
higher risk of getting into conflict (Starr & Thomas 2005). This rather logical 
limitation is not intended as a critic of the democratic peace, but it needs to be 
considered whenever the probability of conflict is to be estimated. 
2.1.3 The Questioned Peacefulness of Democracy 
While most scholars probably would acknowledge that the dyadic version of the 
democratic peace is a rather robust empirical finding, there is far less consensus 
on the general relationship between democracy and conflict. Some scholars 
support the monadic version and argue that democracies are generally less war 
prone than autocracies, while others claim that the democratic peace only applies 
to the dyadic relationship and that democracies are almost, or even just as 
belligerent as autocracies (Elman 1997a: 14-18). Oneal and Russett (1997) find 
that democracies do not fight each other but that they do fight autocracies. 
However, since autocracies fight each other, they conclude that democracies are 
somewhat less war prone in general. Although the monadic relationship remains 
contested, it seems quite uncontroversial to assert that democracies at least battle 
autocracies to a greater extent than they battle each other. 
In addition to the contested general relationship between democracy and 
conflict, another concern about the peacefulness of democracies has been raised. 
Mansfield & Snyder (2005) agree that the democratic peace holds strong for 
consolidated democracies but argue that fledgling democracies, undergoing the 
process of democratization, are highly belligerent and even more war prone than 
autocracies. They have analyzed the relationship between democratization and 
conflict also in a dyadic setting and found that incomplete democratization, where 
the democracy has not been consolidated, increases the risk of conflict (Mansfield 
& Snyder (2002). This implies that joint democracy might not always be a 
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 sufficient condition for peace, as some democracies obviously are more war prone 
than others (Elman 1997b: 488). The transition problem is also illustrated in the 
curvilinear relationship between democracy and the probability of civil war 
(Herge et al. 2001). 
 
2.2 Quality of Government 
2.2.1 What Is Quality of Government? 
In order to properly introduce quality of government, henceforth QoG, as a 
potential key to the democratic peace, a review of the concept is necessary. To 
begin with, QoG is a normative concept since any definition is based on an 
assumption of what is desirable. Frequently included elements in the definitions 
are citizen participation, accountability, transparency, rule of law, and stability 
(Resnick & Birner 2006). However, the rapidly growing literature on QoG often 
employs different definitions of the concept, generating the risk of arbitrary 
results dependent on the interpretation of the individual researcher (Holmberg et 
al. 2008: 4).  
Perhaps most commonly cited is the World Bank definition, developed by 
Kaufmann and associates, according to which governance is “the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” (Kaufmann et al. 2007). 
The bank’s empirical indicators (the World Development Indicators) are however 
largely based on perceptions, which have led some scholars to argue that an 
outcome-based definition would be more accurate in order to increase the 
objectivity. Literacy levels, school persistence rates, medical services, civil 
society empowerment, state of law and order, and crime rates are examples of 
such outcomes (Holmberg et al. 2008: 3-4). 
Although there are a vast number of definitions of QoG available, Teorell and 
Rothstein (2008) recently argued that existing definitions are inadequate. They 
claim that the World Bank definition is too broad, for instance it does not 
distinguish between the access to power and the exercise of power. They also 
criticize outcome-based definitions as those tend to clump cause and effect and 
border on tautologies. Their own contribution, “impartiality“, implies that 
government officials should act in accordance with the beforehand stipulated law 
or policy and take no other considerations into account.  
It seems clear that the debate on the conceptual definition of QoG is far from 
settled. While the diverging views of scholars calls for attention when evaluating 
research on the effects of QoG, the risk of reaching contradicting conclusions 
might not be overwhelming, as there appears to be a strong correlation between 
some of the most common measurements of QoG (Holmberg et al. 2008: 5). 
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 2.2.2 The Relationship between QoG and Democracy 
Democracy and QoG are partially overlapping. Democracy guarantees equality in 
the access to power, but does not influence the exercise of that power. This is why 
democracy is not a sufficient condition for QoG. Democracy is at the same time 
necessary to prevent that laws, albeit being implemented impartially, discriminate 
a certain group in society (e.g. apartheid laws) (Rothstein & Teorell 2008). 
However, Bäck and Hadenius (2008) have tried to sort out the democratic 
elements of QoG and found a J-shaped relationship between democracy and QoG, 
or state capacity as the authors label the concept. That is, democratization will 
initially have a negative impact on QoG! For higher levels of democracy the curve 
turns upwards and there is a strong correlation between consolidated democracies 
and high QoG. Findings similar to those made by Bäck and Hadenius have also 
been made by other researchers (Rothstein & Teorell 2008: 179). 
As the curvilinear relationship between QoG and democracy implies, there are 
several examples of “off-diagonal” cases; that is democratic states with poor QoG 
and authoritarian states with high QoG. Singapore and Hong-Kong is perhaps the 
most obvious examples of the latter, while numerous democracies struggle to 
establish impartial institutions. 
2.2.3 How does QoG Reduce the Risk of Conflict? 
It is widely recognized that weak or failing states cause many of the most difficult 
problems facing the world today. Fukuyama (2004: 92-93) claims that these states 
“commit human rights abuses, provoke humanitarian disasters, drive massive 
waves of immigration, and attack their neighbors”. Tilly (2007: 176) adds that 
“weak states have a destructive propensity to civil war”, which is also confirmed 
statistically, as the probability of civil war increases as a state gets weaker (Öberg 
& Melander 2005). While this knowledge strengthens the notion that QoG might 
reduce the risk of interstate disputes, it does not address the causal mechanism 
between QoG and peace. How then, does QoG affect the risk of interstate 
conflict? 
In order to answer this, it is first necessary to examine the foundations of 
conflict resolution. Fearon (1995) has, in a seminal work on this matter, argued 
that all wars are ineffective ex post and thus that there always is a negotiated 
solution available ex ante which is preferable to both parties. The reason why this 
solution is not always reached is that the parties have asymmetric information 
about their relative military capability and their opponent’s willingness to fight, 
combined with incentives for leaders to misinterpret this information. As Öberg 
and Melander (2005) notes, this implies that “whatever reduces the information 
asymmetry between the parties and/or enables them to communicate resolve 
credibly, will reduce the risk that a conflict escalates to war”.  
So, in what ways does QoG reduce the information asymmetry between states 
and improves their ability to communicate resolve? Most importantly, QoG 
increases predictability in government behavior. It ensures that rule of law will 
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 prevail and that individuals will be treated equally. A strong state hinders civil 
conflict and reduces the risk that civil unrest will incite international disputes. 
This means that citizens as well as the international community better can 
anticipate the actions of the state. An illustrative example of how failed domestic 
policies can create international crises is the mistrust directed towards weak states 
failing to curb terrorism (Fukuyama 2004: 93). QoG also increases the credibility 
of the state as an actor in the international community. A strong state with solid 
and impartial institutions is more trustworthy and less likely as an adversary. If 
other states can rely on that their negotiating partner will remain stable and not 
fall apart any time soon, relations between the countries will be strengthened. On 
the other hand, in corrupt and malfunctioning states, where oligarchs and clans 
battle for power, it might be hard to know who really governs (Johnston 2005: 
152-153). This would make it difficult to anticipate the actions of the state, which 
in turn could make other states suspicious or even contentious. 
The essence of this reasoning is that QoG reduces uncertainty and increases 
trust among states, which equals reduced information asymmetry and improved 
communication channels. This reduces the risk of conflict as peaceful 
international relations are easier to achieve with a stable, predictable, and credible 
state that other nations can rely on.  
The argumentation aims at the dyadic relationship. Since a conflict can result 
from the actions of a single state, it is likely that the beneficial effects of QoG are 
strongest when both states in a dyad are governed qualitatively. Thus, while the 
general relationship between QoG and probability of conflict certainly would be 
interesting to further scrutinize, in this thesis I concentrate on the dyadic 
relationship.  
The abovementioned threats posed by weak states and the fact that conflict 
can be the responsibility of a single state implies that it is the weaker state in a 
dyad which is most likely to break the peace. This argument is known as the 
weakest-link assumption and is commonly applied in the democratic peace 
literature (Oneal & Russett 1999). Based on this argument, along with the general 
motivation on the pacific benefits of QoG, I end this chapter with a hypothesis on 
how QoG affects the probability of conflict: 
 
Hypothesis: The higher the QoG of the weaker state in a dyad, the 
lower the risk of interstate conflict. 
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 3 Method 
To try the hypothesis developed in the previous chapter, I statistically analyze the 
impact of QoG on the probability of conflict. The analysis contains data on dyads 
observed annually between 1984 and 2000. The limited time period is naturally 
not optimal, but since the analysis still contains a considerable amount of cases 
(roughly 100,000), this problem should not be considered insurmountable.  
The core of the data set has been obtained from Sobek and colleagues (2006).1 
Unless otherwise noted, this is the source of the data used in the analysis. The 
dependent variable is conflict and the independent variables QoG and a range of 
control variables. All of the variables are presented more thoroughly later on in 
this chapter. Before that, however, the statistical tool which is used to perform the 
analysis shall be introduced. 
3.1 Logistic Regression 
Logistic regression is a form of regression analysis which is useful when the 
dependent variable is discrete, that is it can only take on a limited number of 
values. The event I am trying to explain—conflict—can only assume two different 
values (it is dichotomous), as there either exists a conflict or it does not. When the 
dependent variable is dichotomous, the method applied is called binary logistic 
regression. 
There are a number of reasons why logistic regression is more suitable than 
ordinary regression when the dependent variable is dichotomous. First, the model 
produced by logistic regression is nonlinear, which fits the S-shaped relationship 
between the dependent and independent variable better than the linear estimate of 
the ordinary regression. Second, the ordinary regression model violates the laws 
of probability as it can produce negative predicted probabilities. This is avoided in 
the logistic regression. Third, logistic regression lacks the distributional 
requirements of the ordinary regression (homoskedasticity and normal distribution 
of residuals) which keeps the estimates of the standard errors more accurate. 
Thanks to theses benefits, logistic regression is the standard method for 
multivariate analysis when the dependent variable is dichotomous (Aldrich & 
Nelson 1984: 12-30). 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Their data can be found here: http://www.davidsobek.com/services.html. The original data set contained 317 
duplicates which have been removed in my analysis. 
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 The downside of logistic regression is that the equation which describes the 
outcome is slightly more complex than the one for ordinary regression. The 
outcome variable, Ŷ, is the probability of having the targeted outcome (in this 
case conflict) based on a nonlinear function of the best linear combination of the 
independent variables: 
 
 
  
where Ŷi is the estimated probability of a conflict in case i (i = 1,…,n) 
and u is the ordinary regression equation: 
 
u = A + B1X1 + B2X2 + … + BkXk 
 
with A being a constant, Bj coefficients, and Xj independent variables 
for k variables (j = 1,2,…,k). 
  
The linear regression equation creates the log odds of the outcome variable. This 
can be understood as the natural log of the probability of a conflict to occur 
divided by the probability of a non-conflict. The coefficients are estimated by 
maximum likelihood, which uses the observed outcome frequencies to find the 
best-fitting linear combination of the independent variables. This is an iterative 
procedure that starts with arbitrary values for the coefficients and then, by 
repeated testing, determines the direction (positive or negative) and size of the 
coefficients (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007: 438-439). 
The nonlinear outcome-function implies that the coefficients can not be 
interpreted the same way as in the ordinary regression model. The coefficients, B, 
are the natural logs of the odds ratio. Negative coefficients reduce the probability 
of conflict and positive coefficients increase it. To make it easier for the reader to 
interpret the effects of the independent variables, the odds ratio, denoted Exp(B), 
is also included in all models. This value should be interpreted as the 
multiplicative factor by which a one unit increase in the independent variable 
affects the odds of a conflict. For instance, a value of 2.95 means that the odds are 
increased 2.95 times when the value of the independent variable moves from 0 to 
1. If the odds ratio on the other hand is below 1, this means that as the 
independent variable increases one unit, the probability of conflict is getting 
smaller. An odds ratio of 0.8, say, means that the odds decrease 20% when the 
independent variable moves from 0 to 1 (Ibid.: 461-462). 
The odds is defined as the probability of conflict divided by the probability of 
non-conflict (i.e. p/(1-p)). At lower probabilities (up to ~0.1), however, the odds 
and probabilities are almost identical. Since interstate conflicts fortunately are 
relatively rare events, the probability of conflict is on average rather small. 
Consequently, it is possible, although not entirely accurate, to interpret the odds 
ratio as an indicator of how the probability of conflict is affected by a one unit 
increase in the independent variable. 
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 The low average risk of conflict also implies that the absolute effects of the 
independent variables are low in general. However, it is important to note that 
what is of most interest in my analysis is the relative effect of the independent 
variables, that is how much each variable affect the probability of conflict in 
comparison with the other variables. In order to illustrate this as clearly as 
possible, I calculate the average relative marginal effect of a one unit increase in 
democracy and QoG respectively (since I consider these to be the most important 
independent variables in my study). The marginal effect is the impact on the 
probability of conflict when the values of the variables move from 0 to 1 and thus 
indicates how much lower, or higher, the risk of conflict becomes. The average is 
calculated by adding the individual marginal effects of all observations in the 
sample (Green 1997: 876). 
Finally, it needs to be said that although it is possible to establish that certain 
factors have statistically significant impacts on the risk of conflict; this does not 
imply that these factors alone can explain the occurrence of conflicts. As a matter 
of fact, the explanatory power of a model is often weak when complex matters, 
such as conflicts, are analyzed. In order to measure how much of a relationship a 
model fails to account for, several measures, so called goodness-of-fit statistics, 
have been developed. In this thesis I am, as I have mentioned, mainly interested in 
the relative effects of the individual variables, so the aggregated explanatory 
power of the models is not paid much attention. However, for the sake of 
scientific coherence, I include in each model the -2 log likelihood value, which is 
a common goodness-of-fit indicator.  
3.2 Dependent Variable: Interstate Conflict 
I have so far only mentioned that the dependent variable is conflict. To settle 
whether there exists a conflict between the states in each dyad, I use the 
Correlates of War MID3 data set data on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) 
(Ghosn et al. 2004). This data records all instances of when one state threatened to 
use force, made a demonstration of force, or actually used force against another 
state. Each year that the two states in a dyad were involved in a dispute with each 
other will be coded as a conflict year. There are roughly 450 conflict years 
recorded during the time period of the study. 
The variable CONFLICT equals 1 if there was an ongoing conflict and 0 if 
there was not. Like Oneal and Russett (1999) I include not only the initial year of 
conflict but also the following, agreeing in their argument that leaders are rational 
and thus constantly reevaluate the present strategy; which implies that a conflict 
one year is not dependent on a conflict the preceding year. 
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 3.3 Independent Variables 
The independent variables reflect the theoretical arguments made in the previous 
chapter. Apart from the variables listed below, all models include a measure of 
peace years (the number of years since the latest conflict between the states in a 
dyad) and three cubic splines.2 These measures are used to correct for 
autocorrelation (influence of past results on the current outcome). However, their 
function is merely technical and the estimates of their coefficients are excluded 
from the tables in the results chapter.  
3.3.1 Quality of Government 
To measure the level of QoG in the dyad, I use the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG), which is a product of the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. The 
data, obtained from the Quality of Government Institute data set (Teorell et al. 
2008), has been collected annually since 1984 and includes roughly 140 countries. 
The main reason why I choose to use the ICRG data, rather than the World Bank’s 
development indicators, is that the former spans over a slightly longer time period, 
which is preferable in the pursuit of statistically significant results. Although the 
ICRG data suffers from some of the flaws mentioned in the theory chapter (for 
instance it is mainly based on perceptions), it is recognized as a trustworthy 
indicator of governmental quality and should fulfill the requirements of this thesis 
quite sufficiently.  
The ICRG indicator of Quality of Government is the mean value of the ICRG 
variables “Corruption”, “Law and Order”, and “Bureaucracy Quality”. It is scaled 
from 0 to 1, where 0 is worst and 1 best. The corruption variable is an assessment 
of the corruption within the political system. It includes financial corruption, 
patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favors-for-favors’, secret party funding, 
and suspicious connections between politicians and businessmen. Law and order 
refers to the impartiality of the legal system and popular observance of the law 
(i.e. crime rates). The bureaucracy quality estimates institutional strength and 
autonomy of the bureaucracy.3 
Since each case in my analysis contains two states, I need to create a 
measurement of the joint QoG of the dyad. Theoretically, I have established that 
the weaker state in a dyad is more likely to break the peace. Therefore, drawing 
on the weakest-link methodology applied in the democratic peace literature 
(Oneal & Russett 1999), I let the state with the lowest ICRG score in the dyad 
represent the joint governmental quality of the dyad. This value is coded as the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 For a technical explanation of cubic splines, see Beck et al. 1998. 
3 The methodology of the ICRG is available at: http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx  
 12
 variable QOGL in the analysis. Thus, if one state in a dyad has an ICRG score of 
0.5 and the other has 0.8, the value of the QOGL variable for the dyad will be 0.5.  
In order to avoid the risk of reverse causality, that is the possibility that 
conflict is actually affecting QoG, I lag the QOGL variable one year. This ensures 
that the results will not be biased, as a conflict occurring in one year hardly can 
affect the level of QoG in the preceding year. 
 
3.3.2 Democracy and Democratization 
To establish the political character of regimes in the dyads, the Polity IV data is 
used. The scale, which ordinarily runs from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most 
democratic), is recomputed to the scale 0 to 1 (0 lowest, 1 highest). This is to 
make comparisons with the effects of the other independent variables easier. As 
with QoG, the weakest-link methodology is applied and the variable DEML thus 
equals the lower of the two democracy-scores in each dyad. 
As mentioned in the theory chapter, Mansfield and Snyder (2002) argue that 
incomplete democratization spurs the risk of conflict between states. To control 
for this, I replicate their measure of incomplete democratization and add it to the 
analysis. However, while they used the Polity III data, I use the Polity IV version. 
Since this data was not included in the data set of Sobek and colleagues (it only 
includes the lower democracy-score for each dyad), I add the Polity IV scores 
from the Quality of Government Institute data set (Teorell et al. 2008). I then 
recode the polity-score into regime type, where scores from -10 to -7 becomes 
autocracies, scores from -6 to 6 anocracies4, and scores from 7 to 10 democracies. 
The regime type for each state in the sample is coded in year t – 1 and again in 
year t – 6. A state is considered to be experiencing an incomplete democratization 
if it has moved from autocracy to anocracy during this five-year interval. If an 
incomplete democratization is taking place in any of the states in a dyad, the 
variable DEMCRATZ equals 1, otherwise 0. The reason for lagging the 
democratization variable is the same as for lagging the QoG variable—to reduce 
the risk of reverse causality. The five year time period is of course arbitrary but in 
accordance with previous research.5  
3.3.3 Power, Preference and Opportunity 
As a response to realist challenges and to account for the geographical limitations 
of international relations, I add a set of commonly applied control variables to the 
analysis. These include an indicator of the relative military strength between the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 “Anoracy” is the label Mansfield and Snyder use to indicate that a regime is somewhere in between a 
democracy and an autocracy. 
5 Consult Mansfield and Snyder (2002) for a longer motivation of the proper length of the time period. 
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 states in a dyad, which is a measure based on the Correlates of War Composite 
Index of National Capabilities (CINC). The variable CAPRATIO runs from 0 to 
1, and indicates the capability ratio between the states. A high value means that 
there is a large discrepancy in the distribution of power within a dyad.  
To ensure that political or military alliances do not account for the lack of 
conflict between states, the dichotomous variable ALLY is also included. It equals 
1 if the states in the dyad have one of the three formal alliances identified by the 
Correlates of War: entente, nonaggression, or mutual defense (Gibler & Sarkees 
2004), and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, similar foreign policies preferences are 
controlled for by the s-scores derived from the alliances portfolios of the states in 
the dyad (Signorino & Ritter 1999). The variable SIMPREF has been recomputed 
to run from 0 to 1 (originally the scale is -1 to 1), where 0 indicates complete 
dissimilarity and 1 complete similarity. 
Since conflict tend to be more common between contiguous states, it is 
necessary to distinguish these dyads from the rest. The variable CONTIG equals 1 
if the states in a dyad share a land border and 0 if they do not. Geographical 
constraints do however not affect major military powers to the same extent, as 
they have sufficient resources to deploy military power anywhere in the world. 
Therefore, the analysis also include the variable POLREL, which equals 1 when 
the states in the dyad are contiguous or if at least one of the states is a major 
military power (i.e. China, France, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, 
or the United States) and 0 otherwise. The name of the variable illustrates that 
these dyads are considered politically relevant.  
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 4 Results 
4.1 The Basic Model 
The results from the logistic regressions are presented in the following. The 
equation which the basic model is based on looks like this:6 
 
CONFLICT = QOGL + DEML + DEMCRATZ + CAPRATIO + 
ALLY + SIMPREF + CONTIG + POLREL 
 
To illustrate the individual effects of democracy and QoG on the risk of conflict, I 
start off by running the model twice, including one of the variables at a time. I 
first exclude the QOGL variable to study the individual effect of DEML. 
Democracy has the expected effect and the risk of conflict falls as DEML 
increases. However, when DEML is exchanged for QOGL and the model is run 
again, QoG clearly outperforms democracy, as the effect of QOGL is almost three 
times as strong. These results are illustrated in table 1 (which only includes the 
coefficients of QOGL and DEML). The table also shows the standard errors and 
the statistical significance (the p-value) of the results. These measures are used to 
estimate with what certainty the coefficients are separated from 0, and thus 
indicate how reliable the results are. A lower p-value indicate a more significant 
finding and values below 0.05, which means that the coefficient with 95% 
certainty is separated from 0, are generally considered statistically significant. 
 
TABLE 1. The individual effects of democracy and quality of government on 
the risk of interstate conflict, evaluated separately, 1985-2000. 
 
Variable B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
  DEML -.594 .155 .00 .552 
  QOGL
 
 
 -1.951 .331 .00 .142  
Number of observations: 155,959 (DEML) and 97,407 (QOGL). 
-2 Log likelihood: 4,551.44 (DEML) and 3,092.81 (QOGL). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 As mentioned earlier, all models also include a measure of peace years and three cubic splines. 
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 Next, I run the complete model and include both QoG and democracy, along with 
the rest of the independent variables. The results are presented in table 2, which 
includes coefficients for all variables in the model. 
  
 
TABLE 2. The effect of quality of government on the risk of interstate conflict, 
1985-2000. 
 
Variable B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
 QOGL  -1.572 .358 .00 .208 
  DEML  -.578 .193 .00 .561 
  DEMCRATZ .323 .163 .05 1.381 
  CAPRAT -.316 .207 .13 .451 
  ALLY .187 .165 .26 1.205 
  SIMPREF .394 .391 .31 1.042 
  CONTIG 0.870 .193 .00 2.386 
  POLREL 1.857 .172 .00 6.407 
  Constant -3.248 .369 .00 .039 
Number of observations: 97,407 
-2 Log likelihood: 3,083.67  
 
The effects of QoG and democracy remain statistically significant and almost as 
strong as when evaluated separately. Incomplete democratization does, as 
suggested by Mansfield and Snyder (2002), increase the risk of conflict. The 
realist variables—relative military capacity, alliances, and similar preferences—
are all insignificant. The geographical constraint has the expected impact, as 
contiguous and politically relevant states are more conflict prone. 
The Exp(B) value indicate that the odds of a conflict in a dyad with a QOGL 
value of 1 is 80% lower than the odds of conflict in a dyad with a QOGL value of 
0. The average marginal effect on the probability of a conflict when QOGL moves 
from 0 to 1 is 0.0037. While this is low (because of the generally low risk), it is 
three times larger than the average marginal effect of a similar increase in the 
DEML variable. The average ratio between the risk of conflict when QOGL is 0 
and when it is 1, is almost five. A conflict is thus on average five times more 
likely in a dyad where the weaker state has a bottom low QoG value, compared to 
a dyad where both states perform at the top. The same ratio for DEML is less than 
two. Quality of government is thus a far more efficient tool than democracy in the 
struggle for peaceful international relations. This becomes even more obvious 
when the negative impact of incomplete democratization is considered. 
 
4.2 Robustness 
To make sure that the results are not dependent on certain interpretations of the 
variables, I include a range of robustness tests where alternative measures are 
used. First, I change the dependent variable from CONFLICT to OUTBREAK, 
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 the latter including only the first year of interstate dispute in a dyad and discarding 
the following. Since different views have been put forward on whether to include 
only the initial year or all of the years when a conflict was ongoing, this control is 
highly motivated (for instance, Mansfield and Snyder (2002) use outbreak as 
dependent variable). The results are presented in table 3 below. 
 
TABLE 3. The effect of quality of government on the risk of outbreak, 1985-2000. 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
 QOGL  -1,994 ,396 ,00 ,136 
 DEML  -,071 ,217 ,74 ,931 
 DEMCRATZ ,073 ,189 ,70 1,076 
 CAPRAT -,400 ,234 ,09 ,671 
 ALLY -,069 ,187 ,71 ,934 
 SIMPREF 1,187 ,465 ,01 3,276 
 CONTIG ,764 ,223 ,00 2,147 
 POLREL 1,727 ,194 ,00 5,626 
 Constant -4,425 ,440 ,00 ,012 
Number of observations: 93,057 
-2 Log likelihood: 2,614.13 
  
It seems safe to say that the effect of QoG holds strong also when the dependent 
variable is changed. In fact, while the impact of QoG remains significant and 
substantial, the effects of democracy and democratization are weak and 
insignificant. Among the realist variables, only similar preferences is significant 
and it has a contradictory effect, as more similar preferences increase, not reduce, 
the risk of an outbreak. While not the focal point of the analysis, this intriguing 
finding certainly questions the validity of the claim that similar foreign 
preferences reduce the risk of conflict. Contiguity and political relevance, on the 
other hand, continue to increase the likelihood of conflict, as expected. It should 
be noted that in this test, only 255 conflicts were recorded—which calls for some 
caution when interpreting the results. 
In the theory chapter I argue that the lower QoG value in each dyad is the 
most suitable measure of joint QoG. It is however possible to apply other types of 
measures. To further explore the relationship between conflict and QoG, I 
evaluate how QOGAVG and QOGH affect the risk of conflict. QOGAVG is the 
average of the two QoG values in each dyad and QOGH is equal to the higher 
QoG value in a dyad. While the theoretical motivation for the average value is 
pretty straight forward, the high QoG value builds on the argument that as the 
state in the dyad with the higher level of QoG improves, the QoG of the dyad as a 
whole also improves. The argument thus follows the same logic as the QOGL 
variable, only the relationship is reversed (cf. Sobek et al. 2006: 523). To make 
the comparison with democracy fair, I include DEMH in the test with QOGH, 
DEMH naturally being equal to the higher democracy value in each dyad. 
As illustrated in table 4, QOGAVG has a somewhat weaker effect than QOGL, 
although it is still significant and stronger than the effect of DEML. When run 
separately, QOGH has no significant impact. When run together with QOGL, 
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 however, QOGH has a statistically significant negative effect, and thus increase 
the probability of conflict. This is illustrated in table 5. The technical reason why 
QOGH has no effect at first is because QOGH and QOGL are positively correlated 
(r=0.49), which means that QOGL limits the impact of QOGH (and vice versa). 
Since the two variables affect the risk of conflict in opposite directions, QOGL 
reduces it and QOGH increases it, a “suppression” effect is created when they are 
run at the same time. 
 
TABLE 4. The effect of quality of government, measured as the dyad average, 
on the probability of  interstate conflict, 1985-2000. 
   
 Variable B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
 QOGAVG
 
 -,906 ,428 ,03 ,404 
  DEML -,719 ,197 ,00 ,487 
  DEMCRATZ ,348 ,164 ,03 1,416 
  CAPRAT -,312 ,206 ,13 ,732 
  ALLY ,247 ,164 ,13 1,281 
  SIMPREF ,202 ,384 ,60 1,224 
  CONTIG ,859 ,202 ,00 2,360 
  POLREL 1,862 ,178 ,00 6,434 
  Constant -3,205 ,405 ,00 ,041 
 
Number of observations: 97,407 
-2 Log likelihood: 3,098.67 
 
TABLE 5. The effect of quality of government, measured as the higher and 
lower value of each dyad respectively, on the probability of interstate conflict, 
1985-2000. 
 
Variable B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
 QOGL  -2,038 ,382 ,00 ,130 
  QOGH  1,232 ,429 ,00 3,427 
  DEML  -,696 ,217 ,00 ,498 
  DEMH  ,024 ,255 ,93 1,024 
  DEMCRATZ ,356 ,164 ,03 1,428 
  CAPRAT -,343 ,207 ,10 ,709 
  ALLY ,226 ,167 ,18 1,253 
  SIMPREF ,555 ,400 ,17 1,742 
  CONTIG 1,133 ,211 ,00 3,106 
  POLREL 1,675 ,182 ,00 5,338 
  Constant -3,996 ,465 ,00 ,018 
Number of observations: 97,407 
-2 Log likelihood: 3,074.15 
 
The results presented in table 5 contradict the intuitive notion that all 
improvements of QoG reduce the risk of conflict. From the theory chapter it is 
possible to deduce that the information asymmetry between the states in a dyad 
might not decrease just because the QoG improves for one of them. This would 
explain why the impact of QOGH is not positive, but not why it is negative. The 
results could possibly indicate that large discrepancies in the QoG of the states in 
a dyad increases the information asymmetry between them, and thus induces 
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 conflict. Another possible explanation is that states with high QoG have a greater 
tendency to intervene into the policies of weaker states (for instance because of 
humanitarian or security reasons). However, the negative impact of QOGH is 
weaker than the positive impact of QOGL and the effect of QOGAVG is also 
beneficial. Since the hypothesis of the thesis, for reasons developed in the theory 
chapter, is directed at the relationship between QOGL and conflict—which 
becomes even stronger when QOGH is taken into account—it is still possible to 
confirm that QoG has a pacifying impact on international relations.  
Finally, I want to ensure that the results are not affected by a slight 
discrepancy between the Polity IV values added from the data set of the Quality of 
Government Institute and the values in the original data set. When a new DEML 
variable based on the data from the QoG institute is created, this variable does not 
perfectly correlate with the old DEML variable. As a precautionary measure then, 
I run all models with the new DEML variable instead of the old. However, all 
results remains unaffected, and the tables from these tests are not included.  
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 5 Conclusion 
In this thesis I analyze the relationship between interstate conflict and QoG in a 
dyadic setting. I pose the question if higher levels of joint QoG reduce the risk of 
conflict and formulate a hypothesis based on the theoretical argument that the 
weaker state in each dyad is more likely to precipitate a break in the peace. By 
running the variable QOGL, together with a number of control variables in a 
logistic regression analysis, I find that improved QoG reduces the risk of conflict. 
The hypothesis is thus confirmed. But what are the implications of this result? 
Since the covered time period is fairly limited, one should generally be 
cautious of drawing to far-reaching conclusions. That being said, the results of the 
analysis clearly illustrate an interesting difference in the pacifying effects of 
democracy and QoG. Although the well-established pacifying benefits of joint 
democracy still applies for consolidated democracies (as increased DEML reduces 
the risk of conflict), the belligerence of recently transformed democracies 
questions the universality of the democratic peace. At the same time, improved 
QoG appears to reduce the risk of conflict substantially, supporting the notion of a 
“QoG peace”. The negative effect of the QOGH variable, which might very well 
be a result of stronger states’ effort to solve problems caused by weaker states, 
does not detract the benefits of governmental improvement, and should not be 
seen as a reason to discourage reform.  
These observations relate to the general debate mentioned in the introductory 
chapter on what policies developing countries should adhere to. It seems as if the 
broad recommendation that governmental reform should be prioritized applies 
also with respect to the international security dimension.  
I end this thesis on a somewhat discouraging note. Although we might know 
that improved governance theoretically have beneficial effects, we still know little 
of how this is supposed to happen. And even if we do have the knowledge, it is far 
from certain it is transferable to the recipient state (Fukuyama 2004). It is an 
understatement to say that these problems need to receive a lot of attention in the 
years to come. 
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7 Appendix: Variables 
 
 
ALLY: 1 if dyad members are linked by entente, nonaggression, or mutual 
defense 
CAPRATIO: ratio of higher to lower power capability in a dyad, scale 0 to 1 
CONFLICT: 1 if the states in a dyad are involved in a conflict with each other 
CONTIG: 1 if the states in a dyad share a land border 
DEMH. higher democracy score in a dyad, scale 0 to 1 
DEML: lower democracy score in a dyad, scale 0 to 1 
DEMCRATZ: 1 if one or both of the states in a dyad are experiencing an 
incomplete democratization 
OUTBREAK: 1 if the states in a dyad are involved in a conflict with each other 
and no conflict between them was ongoing the preceding year 
POLREL: 1 if the states in a dyad share a land border or if one of the states is a 
major military power 
QOGAVG: average of the QoG scores in a dyad, scale 0 to 1 
QOGH: higher QoG score in a dyad, scale 0 to 1 
QOGL: lower QoG score in a dyad, scale 0 to 1 
SIMPREF: s-scores derived from the alliances portfolios of the states in the dyad, 
scale 0 to 1 
 
